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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

WISCONSIN
Gillen v. City of Neenah, 580 N.W. 2d 628 (Wis. 1998) (holding that:
(1) the specific procedures for injunction took precedence over the
general procedures requiring notice of claims against a governmental
body; and (2) a citizen asserting a violation of the public trust doctrine
may directly sue a private party).
In 1952, the legislature granted the rights to land near the south
shore of Little Lake des Morts to the City of Neenah ("City"). The City
was obligated to hold these lands in public trust for the benefit of all
citizens. In 1951, continuing to 1975, Bergstrom Paper Company
("Bergstrom"), the predecessor to P.H. Glatfelter Company
("Glatfelter"), placed sludge material in the grant area. Furthermore,
in 1951, 1974, and 1984, the city leased a portion of the grant area to
Bergstrom and Glatfelter Companies for construction and operation
of a wastewater treatment plant.
In 1995, Minergy Corporation ("Minergy") sought a lease from the
City to construct and operate a commercial facility for paper sludge
processing on a different part of the grant area. The Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR"), City, Glatfelter and Minergy entered a
settlement agreement. As part of this agreement DNR agreed not to
pursue enforcement action under its public trust authority. Thereafter
Minergy and the City entered into a lease authorizing commencement
of Minergy's proposed facility. The City conducted public meetings
and finally the facility was approved. The DNR subsequently issued a
final air pollution control permit and indicated that an environmental
impact statement would not be necessary.
The plaintiffs, environmental activists, initiated suit in the circuit
court as individuals, "and in the name of the State of Wisconsin,"
challenging the Minergy lease and the actions of Glatfelter. The
plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the construction of
the Minergy facility. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
and they appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the case
upon certification from the court of appeals.
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim against the City barred their
action against the City. The court determined that there were two
statutes in conflict. One statute required notice before an action
against a governmental entity and the other specifically provided for
injunctive relief. The supreme court held, "[w]here general and
specific statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific provisions take
precedence" and therefore, the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
notice obligation did not bar their claims.
The supreme court then addressed the issue of whether the public
trust doctrine allowed a citizen to directly sue a private party. The
court held the public trust doctrine, "establishes standing for the state,
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or any person suing in the name of the state for the purpose of
vindicating the public trust to assert a cause of action recognized by
the existing law of Wisconsin." The court then examined the history
and text of the Wisconsin statute providing for actions by citizens for
abatement of public nuisances (plaintiffs claimed the proposed
Minergy development was a public nuisance). The court found no
basis in the history or text to prevent the plaintiffs' standing. The
court held the plaintiffs' claims could therefore go forward.
The concurring opinion agreed that the plaintiffs' failure to file a
notice of claim with the City did not bar their claims. However, the
concurring opinion criticized the per curium opinion stating the
"holding and rationale ... do not apply to the facts of the case ......

The court's unpredictable applications of the notice of claim
requirement, "leaves attorneys and courts guessing about when a
notice of claim must be filed and calls into question the status of cases
now pending or already decided by the courts."
ChristineWise-Ludban

Turkow v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 576 N.W. 2d 288
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the agency has authority over
navigability determinations and that the proper avenue for a challenge
to agency action is through § 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes, not
through a declaratory judgment motion).
In 1942, the construction of Big Lake Road created an artificial
outlet ("the stream") of Big Lake. In 1957, the Public Service
Commission ("PSC") found that the stream was not navigable. After
the PSC finding, Lawrence Turkow purchased the property that
contained the stream. A walkway and a metal fence blocked the
stream at the time he purchased the property.
Mr. Turkow
subsequently erected another walkway that also obstructed the stream.
In 1989, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR")
received complaints from citizens regarding the walkways and the
fence. These obstructions prevented anyone from traveling down the
stream. The DNR investigated and found that the stream was
navigable. After additional complaints from citizens, the DNR wrote to
Turkow advising him as to their finding of navigability. It ordered him
to remove the obstructions within forty-five days or face citation. In
response to the DNR's action, Mr. Turkow filed a complaint against
the agency and both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff based
on his declaratory judgment action. The trial court found that the
DNR lacked jurisdiction due to the PSC's finding of non-navigability.
The trial court precluded the DNR's authority and equitably estopped
the agency from finding that the stream was navigable. The DNR

